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ABSTRACT: In this paper, by using a probabilistic static model, a possible 
relationship between the desirability of economic integration and (illegal) 
immigration is studied. Using the framework developed in Levy (1997), it is shown 
that migration from a labour abundant country to a capital abundant country might  
lead to economic integration between the two countries. By reducing the median 
voter’s utility in the capital abundant host country, migration induces voters in this 
country to support a free trade agreement with the labour abundant migrant sending 
country that will stop further immigration. 
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ÖZET: Bu makalede, statik olasılıklı bir model kullanılarak ekonomik entegrasyon  
ve (illegal) göç arasındaki muhtemel ilişki incelenmiştir. Levy (1997) modelinin ana 
hatları kullanılarak emek yoğun bir ülkeden sermaye yoğun bir ülkeye olan göçün 
bu iki ülke arasında ekonomik entegrasyona yol açabileceği gösterilmiştir. Modelde 
göç hareketi, göçmen alan sermaye yoğun ülkedeki medyan seçmenin fayda düzeyini 
azaltarak, bu ülkedeki seçmenlerin, göçmen gönderen emek yoğun ülkeden 
gelebilecek daha fazla göçü engelleyecek bir serbest ticaret anlaşmasını 
desteklemelerine yol açmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ekonomik Entegrasyon, Serbest Ticaret Anlaşmaları, Eşitsizlik, 
Uluslararası Ticaret, Medyan-seçmen. 
 
1.Introduction 
The two major economic blocks, NAFTA and EU, seem to be centres of attraction 
for migration. It is not far-fetched to assume that in the absence of immigration costs 
and restrictions, these economic blocks would have to absorb huge sizes of poor 
immigrants who would change the economic and ethnic compositions of these 
blocks radically. It is no wonder that the average citizen in these blocks is against 
immigration. It is also reasonable to expect that illegal immigration from developing 
countries to the high-income countries will intensify in the future. In the case of 
economic blocks some of the source countries of this illegal immigration might be 
possible candidates to these economic blocks. Then a natural question arises: “Does 
illegal immigration from a candidate country to an economic block increase or 
decrease the chance of being accepted to that block?” This article deals with this 
question. 
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According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in January 2000, 
there were 7 million illegal aliens living in the United States. It is estimated that this 
number is increasing by half a million a year (Centre for Immigration Studies, 
2004). Therefore the illegal alien population in the beginning of 2005 must be 
around 9.5 million. INS also reports a close link between legal and illegal 
immigration, which is reflected by the fact that 1.5 million green cards were given to 
illegal aliens in 1990s. 
 
The largest share of illegal immigrants to the United States comes from Mexico. As 
shown in Table 1, in 1998, 54% of all illegal immigrants in the US were from 
Mexico. Given this fact it is not surprising that one of the aims of NAFTA was to 
reduce migration from Mexico to the United States by stimulated economic growth. 
Although general agreements on migration were explicitly not part of the NAFTA, 
leaders of both Mexico and the United States supported NAFTA under the 
expectation that in the long run trade would substitute migration. 
 
Table 1. Undocumented immigrants in the US, by country of origin, 1998 
Country of origin Total number of 
undocumented immigrants 
Percentage of total 
undocumented population 
Total 4,700,000 100.0 
Mexico 2,538,000 54.0 
El Salvador 315,000 6.7 
Guatemala 155,000 3.3 
Canada 113,000 2.4 
Haiti 99,000 2.1 
Philippines 89,000 1.9 
Honduras 85,000 1.8 
The Bahamas 66,000 1.4 
Nicaragua 66,000 1.4 
Poland 66,000 1.4 
Colombia 61,000 1.3 
Other 1,047,000 22.3 
Source: Rivera-Batiz (2001) 
 
The NAFTA debate emphasizes the question of whether free trade could stop 
unwanted migration from less developed countries to developed ones. The standard 
comparative static analysis gives the answer that migration of labour without the 
existence of trade tends to decrease and end because of the adjustment of wages. 
Migration decreases wages in the receiving country and it increases wages in the 
sending country. The Heckscher-Ohlin trade model concludes that trade and 
migration are substitutes. Trade, by equalizing factor prices, eliminates the reason 
why people migrate. 
 
An interesting question here is that if migration helps to lead to the creation of 
FTAs, then should we regard migration and trade complements rather than 
substitutes? If the Mexican immigration had not occurred over the years and if there 
were no threat of further (illegal) immigration, would NAFTA get enough support in 
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the United States? Or in the European Union context, could the possibility of further 
unwanted migration from Eastern Europe and Turkey be one of the reasons why 
these regions are in the European enlargement perspectives? 
 
Although the demand for foreign workers in Europe ended abruptly in 1974 after the 
oil shocks, as White (1984) and King (1995) pointed out many migration flows 
continued until 1975. After that migration did not come to a halt, rather the character 
of the flows changed. The migration of single (mainly male) workers was replaced 
by the migration of family members. Also, since Western European economies no 
longer sought foreign workers, for those who want to emigrate to Western Europe 
illegal immigration and political asylum options became more important. 
 
Table 2. Inflows of foreign population into selected European countries  
1990-2000 (thousands) 
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Austria - - - - 59.2 66.0 
Belgium 50.5 55.1 56.0 51.9 50.7 68.6 
Czech Republic - - - 7.4 7.9 4.2 
Denmark  15.1 16.9 15.6 24.7 21.3 - 
Finland  6.5 10.4 7.6 7.5 8.3 9.1 
France 102.4 116.6 91.5 75.5 139.5 119.3 
Germany 824.4 1207.6 774.0 708.0 605.5 648.8 
Greece - - - - 38.2 - 
Hungary 37.2 15.1 12.8 12.8 12.3 - 
Ireland - - 13.3 21.5 20.8 24.1 
Italy - - - - 111.0 271.5 
Luxemburg 9.3 9.8 9.2 9.2 10.6 10.8 
Netherlands 81.3 83.0 68.4 77.2 81.7 91.4 
Norway 15.7 17.2 17.9 17.2 26.7 27.8 
Portugal - 13.7 5.7 3.6 6.5 15.9 
Sweden 53.2 39.5 74.7 29.3 35.7 33.8 
Switzerland 101.4 112.1 91.7 74.3 74.9 87.4 
United Kingdom - 203.9 193.6 216.4 258.0 288.8 
EU (*) - 1756.5 1309.5 1224.9 1238.7 1310.6 
(*): Above countries only (excluding Austria, Greece and Italy) 
Sources: Geddes (2003), OECD (2003) 
 
Following the collapse of the Communist block in Eastern Europe, a new wave of 
migration from East to West emerged. Legal migration of ethnic minorities, like 
German speaking people from former USSR, and illegal immigration from the 
former Communist block countries caused by economic collapse took place. The 
humanitarian catastrophe caused by civil wars in former Yugoslavia led to huge 
increases in the number of asylum seekers into Western European countries in the 
early 1990s. Tables 2 and 3 present a statistical overview of immigration and the 
number of asylum seekers into European countries throughout 1990s. The mere fact 
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that the influx of foreign populations into Europe has never been less than 1 million 
annually throughout the 1990s indicates the importance of immigration for Europe. 
 
Table 3. Inflows of asylum seekers into selected European countries  
1992-2001 (thousands) 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 
Austria 16.2 5.1 7.0 13.8 18.3 30.1 
Belgium 17.6 14.7 12.4 22.1 42.7 24.5 
Bulgaria 0.2 - 0.3 0.8 1.8 2.4 
Czech Republic 0.9 1.2 2.2 4.1 8.8 18.0 
Denmark  13.9 6.7 5.9 5.7 10.3 12.4 
Finland  3.6 0.8 0.7 1.3 3.2 1.7 
France 28.9 26.0 17.4 22.4 38.7 47.3 
Germany 438.2 127.2 116.4 98.6 78.6 88.4 
Greece 2.0 1.3 1.6 2.6 3.1 5.5 
Hungary 0.9 0.4 0.7 7.4 7.8 9.6 
Ireland - 0.4 1.2 4.6 10.9 10.3 
Italy 2.6 1.8 0.7 11.1 24.5 9.8 
Luxemburg 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.6 0.6 0.7 
Netherlands 20.3 52.6 22.9 45.2 43.9 32.6 
Norway 5.2 3.4 1.8 8.5 10.8 14.8 
Poland 0.6 0.6 3.2 3.4 4.4 4.5 
Portugal 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Romania 0.8 - 0.6 1.2 1.4 2.4 
Slovak Republic 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 1.5 8.2 
Spain 11.7 12.0 4.7 6.8 7.9 9.2 
Sweden 84.0 18.6 5.8 12.5 16.3 23.5 
Switzerland 18.0 16.1 18.0 41.3 17.6 20.8 
United Kingdom 32.3 42.2 37.0 58.0 98.9 92.0 
EU 672.0 310.0 234.1 306.7 398.1 388.1 
Sources: Geddes (2003), OECD (2003) 
 
The main idea of this article is that although unwanted migration hurts the median 
voter in the receiving country, free trade with the sending country that will stop 
migration might be preferable to further migration without free trade. The article 
constructs a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson type model in which illegal migration 
from a labour abundant country to a capital abundant country leads to economic 
integration (free trade) between the two countries. The model suggests an 
ambivalent answer to the question of whether goods trade and factor mobility are 
substitutes or complements. On the one hand, the motivation for migration (factor 
mobility) is the absence of goods trade (if there were goods trade, then we would 
have factor price equalization and no labour movement). Furthermore, when 
countries switch from autarky to free trade, labour migration no longer occurs. Thus, 
factor mobility and goods trade seem to be substitutes. On the other hand, the reason 
for free trade is the labour migration, which suggests that factor movements and 
goods trade are complements.  
 
The plan of this article is as follows. In the next section the related literature of 
illegal immigration, substitutability and complementarity of factor movements and 
goods trade, and political economy of economic integration is described. Section 3 
then analyzes free trade and immigration in the static Heckscher-Ohlin framework. 
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2. Literature Review 
To our knowledge, there is no earlier work about the linkage between economic 
integration and illegal immigration.  
Among the earlier works on the illegal immigration it is worth to mention Ethier 
(1986), Bond and Chen (1987), Bucci and Tenorio (1996) and Yoshida (2000), all of 
which include static models.  
 
In Ethier (1986), a simple equilibrium model with border interdiction is developed 
and host country policy toward illegal immigration is analyzed. A detailed analysis 
of how a combination of interdiction and internal enforcement can deal with the 
illegal immigration problem is presented. 
 
By extending Ethier model, Bond and Chen (1987) examine the optimal level of 
enforcement for the host country in a two-country model and consider the effects of 
capital mobility. They derive a formula for the optimal level of enforcement against 
firms that hire illegal workers. They also show that the presence of enforcement 
costs makes the policy less efficient than a wage tax. When capital mobility is 
allowed, foreign workers gain from an increase in enforcement in the home country 
because capital is driven out of the home country. 
 
Bucci and Tenorio (1996) on the other hand examine the effects of financing internal 
enforcement on the host country’s welfare by introducing a government budget 
constraint similar to Ethier’s into a small-country model. Yoshida (2000) by using 
Bond and Chen (1987) and Bucci and Tenorio (1996) models reassess the welfare 
effects of the enforcement policy in terms of the welfare of the host country, the 
foreign country and the world. 
 
In our model the term illegal immigration is used by two reasons. First, median voter 
in the rich country does not want migration, i.e. majority of the rich country does not 
want these immigrants in their country. Second, immigrants from the poor country 
do not posses voting rights in the rich country. They are not legal citizens of the rich 
country and they are not allowed to participate in voting for a possible free trade 
agreement between the country in which they live and the country from which they 
have come. 
 
Since our major aim is to capture the relationship between migration and economic 
integration, rather than welfare effects of various enforcement policies as in most of 
the illegal immigration literature, we do not follow the aforementioned papers to 
model illegal immigration. In our model the illegal aspect of migration is 
represented by the high cost of migration before the economic integration. 
 
The question of whether goods trade and factor mobility are substitutes or 
complements has been discussed since Mundel’s classical paper (1957), in which 
Mundel shows that tariff-generated factor movements have the effect of reducing 
trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. Markusen (1983) examines a 
number of situations, such as differences in production technology and external 
economies of scale, and shows that goods trade and factor mobility may be 
complements if the cause of trade is not factor endowment differences. Generalizing 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, Svensson (1984) compares the goods trade patterns with 
and without factor trade. He concludes that factor trade and goods trade tend to be 
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substitutes (complements) if traded and non-traded factors are “cooperative” (“non-
cooperative”). In their joint paper, Markusen and Svensson (1985) develop a general 
model of trade caused by international differences in production technology and 
examine factor mobility within the context of this model. They show that factor 
mobility leads to an increase in the correlation between goods and factor trade, 
indicating a reinforcement of the pattern of goods trade relative to the no-factor trade 
situation. Thus, they conclude that factor trade and commodity trade are 
complements. Wong (1986) on the other hand develops a 2x2x2 general equilibrium 
framework of the world which allows differences in tastes and technologies between 
the trading countries. He derives the necessary and sufficient condition for 
substitutability and complementarity. Lately Neary (1995) develops a two country 
model of trade and factor mobility in which capital was sector-specific but 
internationally mobile. His model, unlike Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, 
avoids the indeterminacy of the level of trade and factor flows and the propensity to 
specialize in production and trade. 
 
Our political economy analysis was mainly motivated by Levy (1997). In this paper 
Levy compares the desirability of a bilateral trade agreement with multilateral trade 
liberalization. He models countries’ decisions on trade relations as binary choices. 
Countries first choose whether to join a free trade agreement with another country or 
a group of countries, and then they choose whether to participate in a broader 
multilateral agreement. Individuals in each country have different holdings of capital 
and labour and for this reason they have different reactions to any given proposal. 
The decisions of countries are characterized by the decisions of their median voters 
(the individual with the median capital-labour ratio). Levy uses two models, 
Heckscher-Ohlin and Differentiated Product, in his paper. In the former setting, he 
shows that there can be no politically feasible bilateral trade agreements that would 
prevent a politically feasible multilateral trade agreement. However in the latter, a 
bilateral free trade agreement can weaken the support for a multilateral trade 
agreement by offering the median voter a huge product variety gain with relatively 
small adverse price loss that will raise the utility of the median voter above the one 
offered by the multilateral agreement. In our model, we use the Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework of the first part of Levy’s paper. As in Levy’s paper we allow individuals 
to have different holdings of capital so that their reactions to a free trade agreement 
are different. We also retain the majority rule, i.e. the median voter’s preference is 
the chosen policy. 
 
Benhabib’s (1996) paper uses a similar setting to the model used here. He studies 
how immigration policies that impose capital and skill requirements would be 
determined under majority voting when native agents differ in their wealth holdings 
and vote to maximize their income. He shows that the population will be polarized 
between those who would want an immigration policy that will maximize capital-
labour ratio and those who would want an immigration policy that will minimize it. 
We used Benhabib’s notation to describe population sizes and capital stocks in the 
two countries in our model. Another similarity is the majority rule. In Benhabib’s 
paper, as in our model, natives with high capital endowment in the capital abundant 
country benefit from labour immigration whereas natives with low capital 
endowment suffer from it. 
 
Surprisingly there is nothing much in the literature on what is behind the decision of 
a group of countries to bilaterally liberalize factor flows. Giovanni Facchini’s (2002) 
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paper titled “Why does a country join an FTA?” represents a first attempt at 
answering this question. It develops a theory of the endogenous formation of a 
common market in a three country, n-factor model. Import restrictions/subsidies are 
determined by direct democracy, i.e. by the decision of the median voter. The 
decision to join a common market is modelled as a simultaneous move game 
between the two prospective members. It is shown that differences in subsidies 
before the vote do not affect the decision of the median voter. For a common market 
to be established the ex-post factor flows must be balanced. In other words, if most 
of the factor flows are in one direction, then the median voter in the country which 
receives most of the factor flows will be negatively affected. Finally the possibility 
that a common market will be established increases in the number of factors 
enjoying ex post enhanced protection, which indicates the potential tension between 
social desirability and political feasibility of the common market. 
 
This article tries to model the linkage between (illegal) migration and economic 
integration.  As we have seen above, almost all illegal immigration literature 
concerns with welfare(s) of the host country and/or source country. Also no political 
economy paper seems to have dealt with migration and free trade areas jointly. 
Although Facchini’s (2002) model states the importance of ex-post factor flows in 
FTA decision, it assumes no factor flow before the establishment of the common 
market. So far, to our knowledge, there has been no attempt to model the linkage 
between (ex-ante) migration and economic integration, which is surprising given the 
fact that one of the well known reasons of NAFTA was to stop illegal migration 
from Mexico to the US by increasing trade and economic growth in Mexico. By 
showing how the median voter's decision to join an FTA is affected by unwanted 
migration from a relatively poor country, we provide a model which links the 
decision to join an FTA directly to migration. 
 
3. The Model 
There are two countries: relatively labour abundant poor country (P) and relatively 
capital abundant rich country (R). R could be interpreted as an attractive economic 
block and P as a candidate to this block. Each country satisfies the standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions: capital and labour are used to produce two goods, a 
labour-intensive good, QL, and a capital-intensive good, QK, by means of constant-
returns technologies, and there is no joint production. These technologies are 
identical across countries. Consumer preferences for the two goods are homothetic 
and also identical across countries. All markets are competitive. People spend their 
full income on the two goods. Labour intensive good QL is the numeraire; pP is the 
price of QK  in terms of QL in the poor country and pR is the price of QK  in terms of 
QL in the rich country. Under an autarky equilibrium,  pP exceeds pR , since the 
labour-abundant poor country produces more QL relative to QK. As a result, the 
Stopler-Samuelson theorem implies that the real wage in the rich country exceeds 
the real wage in the poor country. 
 
Economic integration is defined as a free trade agreement that will equalize factor 
prices across the two economies. With free trade, the integrated economy that would 
result from factor mobility will be achieved instead through trade flows. To make 
things simple it is assumed that tariffs are either zero or prohibitive, so without free 
trade both countries are in autarky. If two countries establish a free-trade area, the 
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resulting relative price will be between the autarky prices in the two countries and 
the capital-abundant rich country will export QK and import QL. 
 
Initially the only linkage between the two economies is illegal migration from P to 
R. We assume that country P already applied for economic integration with R.  
 
Individuals in each country possess different endowments of labour and capital and 
therefore have different views about the desirability of free trade.  For simplicity, 
assume that everyone supplies one unit of labour but differs in their ownership of 
capital. Individuals are indexed by the units of capital that they own, k. As in 
Benhabib (1996), the number of individuals is given by the density function Nj(k), 
defined on ],0[ jk . We have two countries (poor and rich), so j=P,R. The density 
function Nj(k) is continuous in ],0( jk , but for the poor country at 0 we allow a 
positive mass of individuals that have no capital.  Call this number of individuals 
who do not posses capital Z. These people represent potential migrants. 
 
The initial capital stocks, Kj for j=P,R, are given by  
 
 ∫= j
k
jj dkkkNK
0
)( . (1) 
 
The initial population sizes, LP,0 and LR,0, are 
 
 ∫+= P
k
PP dkkNZL
0
0, )(  (2) 
 
 ∫= R
k
RR dkkNL
0
0, )( . (3) 
 
The country R is relatively capital abundant such that KR/LR,0 > KP/LP,0. 
 
The capital-labour ratios of median voters’ in each country, medianjk  for j=P,R, 
satisfy the following condition: 
 
 
5.0/)( 0,
0
=


 ∫ j
k
j LdkkN
median
j
. (4) 
 
At time t capital-labour ratios are kP,t=(KP/LP,t) and kR,t=(KR/LR,t), where kj,t is the 
capital-labour ratio in country j at time t and Lj,t is the labour stock of country j at 
time t; t=0 and t=1 represent the period before migration and the period after 
migration respectively. Since P is relatively labour abundant, at the beginning (when 
t=0) we have kP,0=(KP/LP,0) < kR,0=(KR/LR,0). We do not have time subscripts on KP 
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and KR , since it is assumed that capital endowments of the two countries are 
constant. The overall capital-labour ratio in P and R together is kU, 
kU=(KP+KR)/(LP,0+LR,0), which is between kP,0 and kR,0. Again we do not need time 
subscript for kU, since total number of individuals in both countries after migration 
(LP,1+LR,1) is equal to the total number of individuals in both countries at the 
beginning (LP,0+LR,0). 
 
Since individuals in each country possess only one unit of labour, but different 
endowments of capital, they have different views about the desirability of free trade. 
The utility of an agent i in country j with a capital endowment ki, is a function of 
income, wj + rj ki and product price pj:  V(wj + rj ki, pj). However, factor prices are 
determined by pj in the Heckscher-Ohlin model (assuming no factor-intensity 
reversals), and pj is determined by the economy’s capital-labour ratio, kj, where the 
relevant economy is either the country of residence in the case of autarky or the 
“integrated economy” in the case of free trade. The resulting utility function can 
therefore be defined, v(ki, kj) = V(w(kj) + r(kj)ki, p(kj)). As Levy (1997) showed, this 
function is strictly quasi-convex in kj and has a unique minimum when the agent’s 
capital-labour ratio is equal to that of the economy.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the strictly quasi-convex utility of an agent with a given capital-
labour ratio as a function of the economy’s capital-labour ratio. Levy (1997) uses 
this figure to illustrate his proposition. If this represented the median voter in a 
country, he would reject trade agreements which resulted in economy capital-labour 
ratios in the range (Autarky, E). Outside of that range, utility increases as the 
distance from Autarky increases.  
 
Figure 2 depicts the utility function for the median voter in the poor country. We 
have the usual assumption that the ownership of capital is skewed, medianPk  < kP,0, 
implying that the median voter would suffer a welfare loss if the economy’s capital 
labour ratio fell towards medianPk . On the other hand, the median voter would gain 
by a free-trade agreement with the rich country, because the integrated economy’s 
economy K/L 
utility 
Autarky E
UA 
ik  
Figure 1. The strictly quasi-convex utility of an agent with a given capital-labour 
ratio as a function of the economy’s capital-labour ratio. 
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capital-labour ratio, kU, is higher than the capital-labour ratio of the poor country, 
kP,0. 
 
 
 
 
 
We are interested in the case where the rich country turns down free trade in the 
absence of migration. This situation is illustrated in Figure 3. In Figure 3, we see the 
utility function for the median voter in the rich country. The symbol, Rκ represents 
the capital-labour ratio at which the median voter is indifferent between economic 
integration (free-trade) and autarky. It satisfies the following two conditions: 
 
UR k≠κ , (5a) 
median
Rk
utility 
0,RkRκ
Figure 3. Utility of the median voter in R when 0,RR
median
RU kkk <<< κ . 
Uk  economy K/L 
median
Pk  0,Pk  
utility 
economy K/L 
Figure 2. Utility of the median voter in P. 
Uk
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))(,)()(())(,)()(( RmedianRRRUmedianRUU pkrwVkpkkrkwV κκκ +=+  . (5b)  
 
As it is seen, 0,RR
median
RU kkk <<< κ .The first inequality indicates the 
reasonable assumption that the rich country’s median voter has more capital than the 
integrated economy’s. The second inequality is implied by the first one, since the 
utility function is u-shaped. Finally, the last inequality reflects the assumption that 
the median voter prefers autarky over free trade in the absence of migration. In such 
a situation, the median voter’s utility in his country under autarky is greater than the 
utility he would get living under the integrated economy. Therefore the median voter 
in the rich country opposes economic integration. 
 
Since the median voter in the rich country rejects a free-trade agreement, there is no 
goods trade and no capital mobility. However, some workers find it possible and 
desirable to migrate from P to R, since real wages are higher in R than in P. We have 
already assumed that all migrants are endowed only their unit of labour but no 
capital. It seems appropriate to interpret migration as illegal for two reasons. First, 
the majority of voters in the rich country do not want immigration. Second, we 
assume that immigrants from the poor country do not possess voting rights in the 
rich country.  
 
The cost of migration is C. To keep the analysis simple, we use the “psychic” cost 
concept of Sjaastad (1962). Migration involves a psychic cost, because people are 
often genuinely reluctant to leave familiar surroundings, family, and friends. We 
might argue that in the case of illegal immigration psychic cost becomes more 
relevant, since immigrants’ very presence is not welcomed by the majority of the 
host country citizens. In our model median voter is against immigration, since his 
real utility is decreasing because of immigration. Median voter with at least half of 
the population in R is against immigration. Living in a foreign country in which 
majority dislikes immigrants must not be very appealing to the potential migrants. 
As Sjaastad explained, psychic costs do not represent real resource costs:  
 
“…Rather they are of the nature of lost consumer (or producer) surplus on the 
part of the migrant. Given the earnings levels at all other places, there is some 
minimum earning level at location i which will cause a given individual to be 
indifferent between migration and remaining at i. For any higher earnings at 
i, he collects a surplus in the sense that part of his earnings could be taxed 
away and that taxation would not cause him to migrate. The maximum amount 
that could be taken away without inducing migration represents the value of 
the surplus. By perfect discrimination, it would be possible to take away the 
full amount of the surplus, but in doing so leave resource allocation 
unaffected (other than through distributive effects). Hence, the psychic cost of 
migration involve no resources for the economy and should not be included as 
part of the investment in migration.” (Sjaastad: 1962,85) 
 
In this model, we have two stages. First, after free trade is rejected in the rich 
country, workers migrate. In the second stage, the rich country votes for free trade 
again. In equilibrium, potential migrants correctly anticipate the probability of a 
free-trade agreement.  
 
Since migrants are not bringing capital out with themselves, migration will decrease 
the capital-labour ratio in the rich country, but it will not be enough to equalize 
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capital-labour ratios across the two countries. If they were equalized, then factor 
prices would also be equalized, implying that migrants incurred the cost of migration 
(C) without any benefit. Also, there would be no need to vote for free trade, since 
factor-price equalization would imply that all the benefits from free trade would 
already have been achieved. Therefore, migration brings the countries’ capital-
labour ratios closer to each other, but does not equalize them. 
 
It is obvious that for a sufficiently high C, migration does not occur. For lower 
values of C, migrants move into the rich country until the expected difference in real 
wages falls to the level that offsets the cost of migration, leaving workers indifferent 
about migrating. In this case the only equilibrium number of immigrants is the 
number which will make the median voter in the rich country indifferent between 
economic integration and non-integration. In other words, after the migration wave 
in the first stage, in the second stage capital-labour ratio will be κR. The reason is 
simple. Let the number of immigrants that will make the median voter in the rich 
country indifferent between autarky and free trade be T. In symbols, the relationship 
between κR and T is κR=KR/(LR,0+T). Any number of migrants greater than T will 
make the probability of economic integration equal to 1, since the capital-labour 
ratio in the rich country will be less than κR after migration and the median voter will 
strictly prefer economic integration in this case. But if the possibility of economic 
integration is 1, no one would want to immigrate and incur migration costs in the 
first place, since they can get all the benefits of economic integration by staying at 
home and not incurring the cost of migration. Therefore it is impossible that more 
than T workers will migrate. On the other hand, any number of migrants less than T 
will make the probability of economic integration equal to 0, since the capital-labour 
ratio in the rich country will still be greater than κR after migration and the median 
voter will strictly prefer autarky that is the possibility of economic integration is 0. 
But if the probability of economic integration is 0, then all workers (more than T) 
would migrate to enjoy the higher wages of R the second stage. Therefore it is 
impossible that less than T workers will migrate.  
 
Then what is the possibility of economic integration when only T number of people 
immigrates to R? We know that the equilibrium level of migration should make 
workers in P indifferent between staying in P without incurring the cost C and 
migrating to R with incurring the cost C. Let κP denote the capital-labour ratio in P 
after the migration of T number of workers; in symbols κP=KP/(LP,0-T). Finally, let 
β(C) be the probability of a favourable vote for free trade, defined as a function of 
migration costs.  This probability must then satisfy the following condition: 
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Proposition 1:  There exists a C*= ))(),(())(),(( PPRR pwVpwV κκκκ −  > 0, 
such that β(C) is positive and decreasing in C for 0 < C < C*,  β(C) = 0 for C > C*,  
and β(C) converges to 1 as C goes to zero. 
 
This proposition can easily be proved by using equation (6). From equation (6), we 
get 
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From this equation, it is easy to see that for any C less than 
))(),(())(),(( PPRR pwVpwV κκκκ − , β is positive for 0 < C < C*. Also, 
since β is negative in equation (7) for any C greater than 
))(),(())(),(( PPRR pwVpwV κκκκ − , β(C) must be 0 for C > C*. Taking the 
derivative of β with respect to C gives us 
 
))(),(())(),((
1
PPRR pwVpwVC κκκκ
β
−
−=
∂
∂
. (8) 
 
The fact that this derivative is negative indicates that β(C) is decreasing in C for 0 < 
C < C*.  
 
With this proposition, we have established a political connection between free trade 
and migration: The lower the cost of migration, the higher the level of migration and 
the more likely is a free trade agreement. In this sense, migration and free trade seem 
to be complements. 
 
Proposition 2: A more egalitarian income distribution in country R, characterized by 
an increase in capital endowment, increases the probability of free trade. 
 
This proposition can be proved with the aid of Figure 4. As illustrated, the rise in the 
median voter’s capital endowment shifts his utility curve up. As a result, it changes 
the autarky capital-labour ratio that would have to exist following migration to leave 
the median voter indifferent between autarky and free trade.   As shown, this ratio 
rises from κR,a to κR,b. The reason for this change is that the rise in the median voter’s 
capital endowment can be shown to increase utility more at kU than at κR,a, because 
the real return on capital is higher at the lower capital-labour ratio. As a result, the 
economy’s capital-labour ratio must rise above κR,a to provide the voter with the 
free-trade utility.  
 
Thus, a more egalitarian income distribution lowers the migration needed to make 
the median voter indifferent between autarky and free trade, i.e. T decreases. With 
less migration, the difference between the two countries’ real wages does not fall as 
much, i.e. ))(),(())(),(( PPRR pwVpwV κκκκ −  increases.  Thus, the 
probability of a free-trade agreement passing (and therefore wages equalizing) can 
rise without reversing incentives to migrate, i.e. the increase in 
))(),(())(),(( PPRR pwVpwV κκκκ −  leads to a lower β in equation (7). 
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4. Conclusion 
By presenting a two-good, two-factor, two-country static probabilistic model of 
migration and economic integration, we provided an analytical basis for studying the 
relationship between immigration and economic integration. As it is stated earlier, to 
our knowledge, there is no previous work in the literature which models migration 
as a cause of free trade agreements. Therefore the model presented in this article 
seems to be the first attempt in this direction. 
 
It is shown that immigration might change the political economy equilibrium trade 
policy from autarky to free trade, which implies a complimentary relationship 
between factor movements and goods trade. This is an interesting result, because it 
conflicts with Mundel’s (1957) classic conclusion that factor mobility in response to 
international factor price differences leads to the elimination of trade via the 
elimination of the factor proportions basis for trade, i.e. factor movements and goods 
trade are substitutes. This important difference is because of the political economy 
and illegal immigration aspects of our model. Illegal immigration changes the 
political economy equilibrium trade policy by changing the median voter’s utility 
level and thus his preference about the trade policy. 
 
Our result about the income distribution and the probability of free trade is in full 
compliance with Mayer’s (1984) prediction about the political economy equilibrium 
trade policies in an unequal society (one in which the relative capital endowment of 
the median individual is less than the mean).  These policies will be biased against 
capital owners. Mayer’s framework indicates that an increase in inequality (the 
difference between the mean and the median capital-labour ratio), holding constant 
the economy’s overall relative endowments, raises trade barriers in capital-abundant 
economies and lowers them in capital-scarce economies. We have found a result that 
is analogous to Mayer’s in the context of free trade areas: An increase in inequality 
in a capital rich country decreases the probability of free trade. 
 
 
Uk aR ,κ bR,κ
utility 
economy K/L 
 
Figure 4. Utility of the median voter when his capital-labour ratio increases. 
median
aRk , medianbRk ,  
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